Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental influence in the conduct of policy.

Central bank independence refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct ... Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) and Walsh (2003, Chapter 8). The empirical ...

5 апр. 2011 г. · I focus on aspects of these interactions. First, is central bank independence meaningless with fiscal acquiescence? And does central bank ...

We parameterize central-bank independence in terms of partisanship and term length, and we focus on the implications of alternative policy structures for ...

According to Walsh (2005) , central bank autonomy (or independence) refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental ...

Walsh, 1995. "Output-inflation tradeoffs and central bank independence," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue sep22. Adam S ...

5 апр. 2011 г. · First, the objectives of monetary policy were clarified, usually through the adoption of inflation targeting. Second, the relationship between ...

Walsh, Carl E. “Central bank strategies, credibility and independence: a review essay.” Journal of Monetary Economics 1993, 32: 287–302. Article Google Scholar.

C.E. Walsh, Central bank strategies. credibility, and independence. Cukierman, Alex and Allan H. Meltzer, 1986, A theory of ambiguity, credibility, and ...

Walsh (1997) provides an argument that may help explain the low inflation/low CBI puzzle in Taiwan. He argues that a higher natural rate of unemployment ...